Implications juridiques de l’interrelation entre le commerce et la concurrence économique en Amérique du Nord
Barre latérale de l'article
Contenu principal de l'article
Résumé
Nous effectuons une analyse comparative des réglementations de la concurrence économique et du commerce international entre le Mexique, les États-Unis et le Canada. Nous observons une corrélation quantitative positive entre le volume du commerce régional et l’entrée en vigueur de la législation sur la concurrence et le commerce en Amérique du Nord. De plus, nous utilisons la méthode déductive pour identifier les implications juridiques de l’interrelation des sujets à l’étude. Nous concluons que la réglementation commerciale devrait adopter une approche de concurrence croisée pour maximiser le bien-être social national et régional, dans le cadre du T-MEC. En outre, il est suggéré d’uniformiser les critères administratifs et judiciaires en matière de concurrence pour faire de l’Amérique du Nord une région économique plus prévisible sur le plan juridique, en réformant la législation potentiellement faussée de l’efficacité productive, telle que la Webb-Pomerene Act des États-Unis.
Details de l'article
Références
Aguirre, Jerjes y Gómez, Mario, “Debilidad institucional y experiencia anticrimen en México”, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, vol. 29, 2021.
Anaya, Jorge et al., “Evolución del derecho de la competencia en México”, Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, México, vol. 126, 2009.
Audretsch, David, “Antitrust policy in the 1980s and beyond”, Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 5, núm. 2, 1990.
Berge, Wendell, “Problems of Enforcement and Interpretation of the Sherman Act”, The American Economic Review, vol. 38, núm. 2, 1948.
Bhattacharyya, Anjana et al., “Government Interventions, Market Imperfections, and Technical Inefficiency in a Mixed Economy: A Case Study of Indian Agriculture”, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 22, núm. 3, 1996.
Bork, Robert, The Antitrust Paradox: a Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books, 1978.
Choi, Jay y Gerlach, Heiko, “Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 30, núm. 6, 2012.
“Competencia: Motor de crecimiento económico incluyente”, COFECE, 2018, disponible en: https://www.cofece.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Memoria-Competencia-Motor-de-crecimiento-incluyente-.pdf#pdf.
Cucinotta, Antonio et al., Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law. Elgar Publishing, 2002.
García, Luis Gerardo et al., “Mexico: New Antitrust Authorities and a New Federal Economic Competition Law”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 6, 2015.
Haber, Stephen, Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence, Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 2002.
Hazlett, Thomas, “The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined”, Economic Inquiry, vol. 30, núm. 2, 1992.
Hovenkamp, Herbert, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago”, Michigan Law Review, Michigan, vol. 84, núm. 2, 1985.
Hovenkamp, Herbert, “Post-Chicago Antitrist: A Review and Critique”, Columbia Business Law Review, Columbia, vol. 257, 2001.
Hovenkamp, Herbert, “The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond”, Iowa Law Review Bulletin, Iowa, vol. 95, 2010.
Hovenkamp, Herbert y Scott, Fiona, “Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Pennsylvania, vol. 168, núm. 7, 2020.
Kobayashi, Bruce y Muris, Timothy, “Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century”, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 78, 2012.
Leal, Ruben, Competencia económica y comercio internacional, México, Tirant lo Blanch, 2021.
Leal, Ruben y Rudenko, Slavomir, “COVID-19 Impact on Economic Regulations and Foreign Trade Between China, Europe and North America”, Journal of Zhejiang Wanli University, vol. 34, núm. 4, 2021.
Loecker, Jan de y Biesebroeck, Johannes van, “Effect of International Competition on Firm Productivity and Market Power”, NBER Working Paper 21994, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
Loevinger, Lee, “The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law”, Virginia Law Review, Virginia, vol. 50, núm. 1, 1964.
López, Gabriela, “El efecto de la liberalización comercial sobre los márgenes de precios del sector manufacturero”, El Trimestre Económico, México, vol. 82, núm. 3, 2015.
López-Velarde, Alejandro, “The Application of the Antitrust Law Under the New Rules of the Oil and Gas Industry in Mexico”, Energy Law Journal, vol. 38, núm. 1, 2017.
Motta, Massimo, Política de competencia: teoría y práctica, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2018.
Renckens, An, “Welfare Standards, Substantive Tests, and Efficiency Considerations in Merger Policy: Defining the Efficiency Defense”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 3, núm. 2, 2007.
Romero, José, “Sustitución de importaciones y apertura comercial: Resultados para México”, en Puyana, Alicia (coord.), La Integración Económica y la Globalización: Nuevas propuestas para el proyecto latinoamericano, FLACSO, 2003.
Ross, Tomas y Winter, Ralph, “The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law: Economic Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments”, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 72, núm. 2, 2005, disponible en: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40843631.
Sacristán, Emilio, “Las privatizaciones en México”, Economía UNAM, vol. 3, núm. 9, 2006.
Sokol, Daniel, “Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age”, Berkeley Business Law Journal, vol. 4, núm. 1, 2007.
Stanford, J. S., “The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View from Abroad”, Cornell International Law Journal, núm. 11, 1978.
Stout, Lynn, “The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance”, Journal of Corporation Law, vol. 28, núm. 4, 2003.
Stucke, Maurice y Ezrachi, Ariel, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement”, Harvard Business Review, 2017.
Sawyer, Laura, “US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective”, Harvard Business School, 2019.
Ten Kate, Adriaan, “La eficiencia económica en el análisis de competencia”, Competencia Económica en México, Comisión Federal de Competencia, 2004.
Van Hassel, Edwin, et al., “Reconsidering Nearshoring to Avoid Global Crisis Impacts: Application and Calculation of the Total Cost of Ownership for Specific Scenarios”, Research in Transportation Economics, vol. 93, 2022.
Williamson, Oliver, “Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust”, The American Economic Review, vol. 59, núm. 2, 1969.
Witker, Jorge y Varela, Angelica, Derecho de la competencia económica en México, México, UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2003.
Yvon, Anne-Marie, “Settlements between Brand and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: A Reasonable Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payments”, Fordham Law Review, vol. 75, 2007.
